IRS Summons Issued at Canada\u27s Request Enforceable Even Though Information Would Also Be Used For Criminal Prosecution Purposes in Canada by Setright, Ami
IRS SUMMONS ISSUED AT CANADA'S REQUEST 
ENFORCEABLE EVEN THOUGH INFORMATION 
WOULD ALSO BE USED FOR CRIMINAL 
PROSECUTION PURPOSES IN CANADA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States-Canada Tax Convention of 19421 requires 
each contracting state to furnish the other with information ob-
tainable under the former's revenue laws insofar as the informa-
tion may be of use to the requesting state in the assessment of 
taxes.2 This Recent Development analyzes the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals' decision in United States v. Manufacturers and Traders 
Trust Co.,3 in which the Tax Convention of 1942 was held to per-
mit the transfer of information despite the fact that such informa-
tion would also be used for criminal prosecution in the requesting 
nation. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT DECISION 
In the Manufacturers and Traders Trust decision below, the 
Tax Convention was applied to the following facts: 4 Robert Jane, 
a Canadian citizen, and his wife were residents of Canada until 1978. 
The Canadian Department of National Revenue (CDNR) was in-
vestigating their Canadian income tax liabilities for 1976-1978, and 
in the course of that inquiry, the Canadian authorities made a 
jeopardy assessment5 against Robert Jane on the theory that he 
was transferring assets out of Canada. Jane then commenced 
bankruptcy proceedings in Canada. The Royal Canadian Mounted 
1. United States-Canada Tax Convention of 1942, in force June 15, 1942, United States-
Canada, 56 STAT. 1399, T.S. No. 983, 124 U.N.T.S. 271 [hereinafter cited as the "Tax 
Convention"]. 
2. Id. at art. XIX. Article XIX further provides: "The information to be furnished under 
the first paragraph of this Article, whether in the ordinary course or on request, may be 
exchanged directly between the competent authorities of the two contracting States." 
3. 703 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1983). 
4. Statement of facts found by the District Court for the Western District of New 
York, reported at 703 F.2d 47, 49. 
5. "Jeopardy Assessment" is defined as follows: 
If the collection of a tax appears in question, the IRS may assess and collect the 
tax immediately without the usual formalities. Also, the IRS has the power to ter-
minate a taxpayer's taxable year before the usual date if it feels that the collec-
tion of the tax may be in peril because the taxpayer plans to leave the country. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 749 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
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Police (RCMP), charged with investigating criminal matters con-
cerned with bankruptcy, became involved. There was a continuing, 
close working relationship between the officials of CDNR, respon-
sible for inquiring into the Janes' tax liability, and the RCMP, 
responsible for criminal aspects of Robert Jane's bankruptcy. The 
CDNR's working papers were turned over to the RCMP, and the 
agent working on the civil tax case was ordered to respond to the 
RCMP agent's questions. CDNR subsequently requested informa-
tion from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under the Tax Con-
vention, and the IRS, pursuant to the request, issued summonses 
to obtain such information. The district court, however, refused to 
enforce them. 
In the past, case law has interpreted the Tax Convention to 
mean that if Canada is investigating the liability of a potentially 
delinquent taxpayer, the United States may utilize the same in-
vestigative techniques that it would employ if that person were 
under IRS investigation for domestic tax liability.6 Moreover, if a 
person is under IRS investigation for a domestic tax liability, the 
investigator must show that such investigation is being conducted 
for a legitimate purpose.7 If the sole objective of the investigation 
were to obtain evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, the pur-
pose would not be considered a legitimate one, and enforcement 
would be denied. 8 
The district court, in Manufacturers and Traders Trust, found 
such an illegitimate purpose because there was an agreement, ex-
press or implied, that if the CDNR obtained enforcement of the sum-
mons against Jane, the information procured would be made 
available to the RCMP for its criminal investigation. The court con-
cluded that the material sought by the CDNR was intended, at least 
in part, for the use of the RCMP.9 The district court then applied 
the criteria, established by the Supreme Court, for the enforcement 
of IRS summonses in domestic cases and ordered that enforcement 
be denied because of "bad faith." 10 
6. United States v. A. L. Burbank & Co., Ltd., 525 F.2d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
426 U.S. 934 (1976). 
7. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964). The IRS must "show that the in-
quiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not already within 
the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps required by the Code have 
been followed-in particular, that the" Secretary or his del~gate, "after investigation, has 
determined the further examination to be necessary and has notified the taxpayer in writing 
to that effect." Id. at 57-58. 
8. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964). 
9. United States v. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co., 703 F.2d 47, 49 (2d Cir. 1983). 
10. Id.; see infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. 
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III. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
Applying an expansive approach to the Tax Convention,10athe 
United States court of appeals reversed the district court in United 
States v. Manufacturers and Traders Trust Co. 11 The court conceded 
that if this were a wholly domestic matter, the ruling below might 
have been sustained.12 The court however, held that "the re-
quirements for summons-enforcement are not in all respects precise-
ly the same [for international cases as they are] for domestic cases" 
and in this case, the "Government satisfied all the standards ap-
plicable under the Convention."13 
The first prerequisite in obtaining enforcement of a summons 
under the Convention, said the court, is that the CDNR must be 
considering the income tax liability of a person under the revenue 
laws of Canada.14 
Next, it must be determined whether there is any prohibition 
either on obtaining the information for partly criminal investigatory 
purposes, or against the interchange of information between the 
Canadian officials interested in civil liability and those concerned 
with criminal prosecution. There are no such prohibitions under 
Canadian or international law. United States law must then be 
considered.15 
Article XXI, section 1 of the Tax Convention empowers the 
Commissioner to furnish such information "as the Commissioner 
is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of the United States 
of America."16 One interpretation of this phrase is that it incor-
lOa. See, e.g., United States v. A.L. Burbank, 525 F.2d at 13. 
11. 703 F.2d at 47. 
12. Id. at 50. On the other hand, the ruling might not have been sustained in an 
analagous domestic case. For example, in United States v. Chemical Bank, 593 F.2d 451, 
456 (2d Cir. 1979), a summons was enforced even though there was considerable interaction 
between the IRS and the Strike Force coordinated by the Department of Justice. In United 
States v. Scholbe, 664 F.2d 1163, 1167 (10th Cir. 1981), a summons was enforced where the 
IRS had not recommended criminal prosecution, but an ongoing criminal non-tax investiga-
tion was under way and the IRS had agreed to pr~vide the other agency with information 
secured by the tax investigation. Again, in United States v. Stuckey, 646 F.2d 1369, 1376-77 
(9th Cir. 1981), a summons was enforced where the taxpayer was also under investigation 
for drug offenses and the IRS was willing to share information with the Drug Enforcement 
Administration. See also 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), a statute authorizing 
disclosures by the IRS to federal agents administering non-tax laws in certain defined 
circumstances. 
13. 703 F .2d at 50-51. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Tax Convention, supra note 1, at art. XXL 
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porates all domestic laws, including the full judicial gloss govern-
ing IRS summonses and their enforcement. This is the interpreta-
tion that the district court followed. The court of appeals, on the 
other hand, took the more liberal approach that the judicial gloss 
need not be the same for an international case as for a wholly 
domestic one. The court held that the Commissioner can have dif-
ferent "entitlements" under "the revenue laws of the United States 
of America" in the two separate kinds of cases.17 Neither Article 
XIX, nor Article XXI of the Tax Convention state that the IRS 
should have exactly the same authority in both areas, or that the 
Commissioner shall have only those powers under the treaty as he 
has in the wholly domestic sphere.18 
Aside from this question of authority, the policies behind the 
revenue laws of the United States wherein the enforcement of an 
IRS summons is restricted to cases in which there is a legitimate 
purpose, are "wholly internal."19 Federal criminal prosecutions in 
this country are the responsibility of the Department of Justice, 
not the IRS. Second, discovery in American criminal cases is 
restricted to the grand jury.20 These policies are not applicable to 
Canada which does not have such "marked separations, and does 
not normally use the grand jury ."20a Moreover, there is no reason to 
apply these policies to a case under this treaty. The United States 
has no interest in thrusting these policies into Canadian prosecu-
tions. Likewise, Canada has no interest in having these policies ap-
plied to its taxpayers.21 
Another element in the court of appeals' decision was that 
the need for the summons was Canada's alone, and information 
sought would be used there only. If the U.S. did not comply with 
the summons request, Canada might consider it a failure to comply 
with the Tax Convention. Canada might indeed wonder what in-
terest or right the United States has in applying its internal policies 
to a case in which only Canada is involved. Moreover, our inter-
national relations with Canada might well be strained, and the ex-
ecutives of both countries might be embarrassed if a valid request 
was denied.22 
17. 703 F.2d at 51. 
18. Id. ; see also United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., Ltd., 525 F.2d 9, 13 (2d Cir. 1975). 
19. 703 F.2d at 52. 
20. Id.; see also United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978). 
20a. 703 F.2d at 52. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at 52-53. 
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Additionally, IRC section 7852(d),23 dictates that no provision 
of the Code "shall apply in any case where its application would 
be contrary to any treaty obligation of the United States in effect 
on the date of enactment" of the Code.24 
The court of appeals concluded from this analysis that it was 
not "bad faith" for Canadian tax officials to intend to share infor-
mation, obtained from the IRS, with other officials investigating 
and prosecuting a Canadian criminal case.25 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The Second Circuit's decision in Manufacturers and Traders 
Trust cannot be viewed in a legal vacuum. The applicable provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code, and several decisions of the 
Supreme Court, suggest that in cases where the IRS attempts to 
obtain information from Canada for possible domestic criminal pro-
secutions, such information may not be transferred to U.S. officials. 
As noted above, the 1942 Tax Convention provides for the 
transfer of information between the U.S. and Canadian revenue 
departments, where that information would prove useful in the 
assessment of tax liability.26 The Convention further provides that 
if the CDNR deems it necessary to secure the cooperation of the 
IRS in determining tax liability, the IRS may furnish the CDNR 
such information as is obtainable under the revenue laws of the 
United States.27 The Internal Revenue Code authorizes the 
Secretary of the Treasury to examine any books, papers, records, 
or other data which may be relevant or material to an inquiry con-
cerning a taxpayer's return. Summonses may also be issued to per-
sons in possession of account books that relate to the targeted tax-
payer's business.28 Not all such summonses, however, will be 
enforced. 
23. 26 U.S.C. § 7852(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
24. Id. 
25. 703 F .2d at 53. 
26. Tax Convention, supa note l, at art. XIX. 
27. Id. at art. XXL Article XXI further provides: 
2. If the Commissioner in the determination of the income tax liability of any per-
son under any of the revenue laws of the United States of America deems it 
necessary to secure the cooperation of the Minister, the Minister may, upon re-
quest, furnish the Commissioner such information bearing upon the matter as the 
Minister is entitled to obtain under the revenue laws of Canada. 
28. 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). If the summoned person refuses or fails 
to comply, the district courts have jurisdiction to enforce the summons. 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402(b), 
7604. 
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In United States v. LaSaUe National Bank,29 the Supreme Court 
found that two requirements emerge for the enforcement of an IRS 
summons. First, the summons must be issued before the Service 
recommends to the Department of Justice that a criminal prose-
cution reasonably related to the subject matter of the summons 
be undertaken. Second, the Service must use the summons authority 
in good faith pursuit of the congressionally authorized purposes of 
26 u.s.c. § 7602.30 
The meaning of "good faith" was explained in United States 
v. Powell,31 as follows: (1) the investigation must be conducted for 
a legitimate purpose (i.e., the IRS must retain an interest in civil 
tax collection); (2) the material sought must be relevant to the 
legitimate purpose of the investigation; (3) the information must 
not yet be in the possession of the IRS; and (4) the proper ad-
ministrative steps must be followed.31a 
In United States v. Garden State National Bank,32 the Third Cir-
cuit explained that the IRS has the power to issue summonses in 
the course of its investigation of civil tax liability even if evidence 
thereby uncovered might subsequently serve as the basis for a 
criminal prosecution of the taxpayer. The IRS may not, however, 
use its power to issue administrative summonses for the sole pur-
pose of conducting or furthering a criminal investigation on its own 
behalf, or on behalf of the Justice Department.33 
Furthermore, a taxpayer can be summoned, as well as be re-
quired to produce books and records, and to testify concerning in-
come tax liability where the purpose is to ascertain the correct-
29. 437 U.S. 298 (1978). 
30. Id. at 3'11-12. While the LaSalle court was unanimous in imposing an absolute ban 
on enforcement of IRS summonses issued after the case has been referred to the Justice 
Department, it was divided on the question of the validity of summonses issued before that 
referral. Four Justices would have held any summons issued before the cutoff to be con-
clusively valid. Id. at 319-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The majority, however, left open the 
possibility that such a pre-referral summons could be challenged by the taxpayer if the Service 
as an institution had not issued the summons in "good faith." Id. at 313-18 (Blackmun, J.). 
The congressionally authorized purposes include: "ascertaining the correctness of any return, 
making a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for 
any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary 
of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting any such liability .. . . " 
26 u.s.c. § 7602. 
31. 379 U.S. 48, 57-58. 
31a. Id. at 58. 
32. 607 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1979). 
33. Id. at 66. 
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ness of the taxpayer's return. The fact that there may also be other 
purposes in particular cases is irrelevant.34 In other words, if the 
sole objective of a domestic tax investigation is to obtain evidence 
for use in a criminal prosecution, the purpose is not legitimate, and 
enforcement of an IRS summons should be denied.35 If the investiga-
tion will be conducted for a legitimate purpose, however, the sum-
mons will be enforced.36 This is not, however, necessarily the case 
under the Tax Convention. 
Judicial interpretation of the Tax Convention has yielded a dif-
ferent result. In United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., Ltd., 37 the 
Second Circuit found that one purpose of the Tax Convention was 
to provide a means of cooperation between the contracting states 
whereby information could be exchanged through the administrative 
processes provided by the statutory laws of each nation.38 Generally, 
treaties must be broadly construed if their intent is to be given 
effect.39 When a provision of a treaty fairly admits of two construc-
tions, one restricting, the other enlarging rights which may be 
claimed under it, the more liberal interpretation is to be preferred.40 
The latter construction is adopted because diplomatic and good faith 
considerations require that treaty obligations should be liberally 
construed so as to secure equality and reciprocity between the con-
tracting states.41 
Aside from general principles of construction, section 7852(d) 
of the 1954 Code,42 which was enacted after the Tax Convention, 
provides that no provision of the Code shall apply in any case where 
its application would be contrary to any treaty obligation of the 
United States in effect on the date of enactment of the Code.43 Thus, 
while the Second Circuit's decision in Manufacturers and Traders 
Trust Co. is seemingly consistent with the U.S. Obligations under 
the 1942 Tax Convention, it must, of course, await future develop-
ment in the area. 
34. Lash v. Nighosian, 273 F.2d 185 (1st Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1959). 
35. Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966). 
36. Id. 
37. 525 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1975). 
38. Id. at 13. 
39. Id. at 14. 
40. Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940). 
41. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293-94 (1933). 
42. 26 U.S.C. § 7852(d) (1976 & Supp. 1981). 
43. Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has 
determined that under the Tax Convention, the IRS can obtain in-
formation requested by Canada to help determine a Canadian tax-
payer's liability, despite the fact that a primary purpose of the re-
quest may be to further a Canadian criminal prosecution, and even 
though such request may have been denied if it had been made in 
the course of a domestic IRS investigation. The requirements for 
enforcement of an IRS summons are not the same under the Con-
vention as they are for wholly domestic cases. The policies behind 
the revenue laws of the United States that cause summons enforce-
ment to be restricted do not apply to Canada, and therefore the 
judicial gloss of our laws should not apply to a case under the Tax 
Convention. The decision implies that Canada may obtain informa-
tion from the United States that may be used for criminal prosecu-
tions, whereas under the same circumstances, in a wholly domestic 
case, such information would not be obtainable by the IRS. 
Ami Setright 
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